17. Three Ways of Inheriting Austin

Abstract

In this paper I will sketch three different ways of reading Austin. In order to have some bit of Austin before us to show that it can be and has been read in each of these three different ways, let us begin with a characteristic passage from Austin. In A Plea for Excuses, Austin writes: Modification without aberration. When it is stated that X did A, there is a temptation to suppose that given some, indeed perhaps any, expression modifying the verb we shall be entitled to insert either it or its opposite or negation in our statement: that is, we shall be entitled to ask, typically, “Did X do Mly or not Mly?” (“Did X murder Y voluntarily or involuntarily”), and to answer one or the other. Or as a minimum it is supposed that if X did A there must be at least one modifying expression that we could, justifiably and informatively, insert with the verb. In the great majority of the cases of the use of the great majority of verbs (“murder” perhaps is not one of the majority) such suppositions are quite unjustified. The natural economy of language dictates that for the standard case covered by any normal verb—not, perhaps, a verb of omen such as “murder”, but a verb like “eat” or “kick” or “croquet” – no modifying expression is required or even permissible. Only if we do the action named in some special way or circumstances, different from those in which such an act is naturally done (and of course both the normal and the abnormal differ according to what verb is in question) is a modifying expression called for or even in order. I sit in my chair, in the usual way – I am not in a daze or influenced by threats or the like: here, it will not do to say either that I sat in it intentionally or that I did not sit in it intentionally, nor yet that I sat in it automatically or from habit or what you will..

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'When You (Say You) Know, You Can't Be Wrong': J.L. Austin on 'I Know' Claims.Sabina Vaccarino Bremner - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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