A Mysterious Case of Missing Value

Philosophic Exchange 45 (1):1-22 (2016)
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Abstract

Sometimes there are conflicts about what we ought to do according to differing evaluative dimensions, like morality and self-interest. After sketching an interpretation of "ought" claims of all sorts, it is argued that there is no overriding evaluation that authoritatively resolves the conflicts. It is further argued that this is not altogether disappointing.

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Earl Conee
University of Rochester

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