In this article I reflect on the question of whether we can have reason to make transformative choices. In attempting to answer it, I do three things. First, I bring forward an internalist account of practical reasons which entails the idea that agents should deliberate to the best of their ability. Second, I discuss L.A. Paul’s views on transformative choice, arguing that, although they present a real problem, the problem is not as profound as she believes it is. Third, I argue that, given the situation in which we face transformative choices, trust is an appropriate response to transformative choices, and that when one’s trust that one’s current desires will be fulfilled in making a transformative choice is reasonable, one has a reason to make it. Thus, trust turns out to be a crucial response to a profound problem each of us will face during our lives.
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DOI 10.1080/09672559.2018.1450084
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References found in this work BETA

The Moral Problem.Michael Smith (ed.) - 1994 - Wiley.
Transformative Experience.Laurie Ann Paul - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.

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Trust and Reason.Edward Hinchman - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
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