Normative Requirements and Contrary-to-Duty Obligations

Journal of Philosophy 112 (11):600-626 (2015)
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Abstract

I argue that normative requirements should be interpreted as the conditional obligations of dyadic deontic logic. Semantically, normative requirements are conditionals understood as restrictors, the prevailing view of conditionals in linguistics. This means that Modus Ponens is invalid, even when the premises are known

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Juan Comesaña
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Supererogation and Conditional Obligation.Daniel Muñoz & Theron Pummer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1429–1443.
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Harm, responsibility, and enforceability.Christian Barry - 2019 - Ethics and Global Politics 12 (1):76-97.

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References found in this work

Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.
Conditionals.Angelika Kratzer - 1986 - Chicago Linguistics Society 22 (2):1–15.

View all 14 references / Add more references