Why Perceptual Experiences cannot be Probabilistic

Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Perceptual Confidence is the thesis that perceptual experiences can be probabilistic. This thesis has been defended and criticised based on a variety of phenomenological, epistemological, and explanatory arguments. One gap in these arguments is that they neglect the question of whether perceptual experiences satisfy the formal conditions that define the notion of probability to which Perceptual Confidence is committed. Here, we focus on this underexplored question and argue that perceptual experiences do not satisfy such conditions. But if they do not, then ascriptions of perceptual confidence are undefined; and so, Perceptual Confidence cannot be true.

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Author Profiles

Nir Fresco
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Matteo Colombo
Tilburg University

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References found in this work

Perception.Adam Pautz - 2020 - New York, NY: Routledge.
Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?Tim Crane - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.
Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind.Matteo Colombo, Lee Elkin & Stephan Hartmann - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):185-220.
What are degrees of belief.Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.
Modeling Mental Qualities.Andrew Y. Lee - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):263-209.

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