Philosophia 45 (4):1437-1451 (2017)

Giovanna Colombetti
University of Exeter
In this paper I argue that it is misleading to regard the brain as the physical basis or “core machinery” of moods. First, empirical evidence shows that brain activity not only influences, but is in turn influenced by, physical activity taking place in other parts of the organism. It is therefore not clear why the core machinery of moods ought to be restricted to the brain. I propose, instead, that moods should be conceived as embodied, i.e., their physical basis should be enlarged so as to comprise not just brain but also bodily processes. Second, I emphasise that moods are also situated in the world. By this I do not simply mean that moods are influenced by the world, but that they are complexly interrelated with it, in at least three different ways: they are shaped by cultural values and norms; they are materially and intersubjectively “scaffolded”; and they can even “experientially incorporate” parts of the world, i.e., include the experience of parts of the world as part of oneself.
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-017-9817-0
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References found in this work BETA

Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

An Enactive Approach to Pain: Beyond the Biopsychosocial Model.Peter Stilwell & Katherine Harman - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (4):637-665.
What Can the Concept of Affective Scaffolding Do for Us?Jussi A. Saarinen - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (6):820-839.
Merleau-Ponty.Joel Krueger - 2020 - In Thomas Szanto & Hilge Landweer (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotions. Routledge. pp. 197-206.
Still Life, a Mirror: Phasic Memory and Re-Encounters with Artworks.Clare Mac Cumhaill - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):423-446.

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