Scaffoldings of the affective mind

Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1157-1176 (2015)
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Abstract

In this paper we adopt Sterelny's framework of the scaffolded mind, and his related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the extended-mind view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines, and develop phenomenological considerations to distinguish different ways in which we experience the world affectively.

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Author Profiles

Giovanna Colombetti
University of Exeter
Joel Krueger
University of Exeter

Citations of this work

Hostile Scaffolding.Ryan Timms & David Spurrett - 2023 - Philosophical Papers 52 (1):1-30.
Trust as an unquestioning attitude.C. Thi Nguyen - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7:214-244.
Extended emotions.Joel Krueger & Thomas Szanto - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):863-878.

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References found in this work

The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
The Bounds of Cognition.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2008 - Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by Kenneth Aizawa.

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