Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (1):121-147 (2021)
AbstractThe replication crisis has prompted many to call for statistical reform within the psychological sciences. Here we examine issues within Frequentist statistics that may have led to the replication crisis, and we examine the alternative—Bayesian statistics—that many have suggested as a replacement. The Frequentist approach and the Bayesian approach offer radically different perspectives on evidence and inference with the Frequentist approach prioritising error control and the Bayesian approach offering a formal method for quantifying the relative strength of evidence for hypotheses. We suggest that rather than mere statistical reform, what is needed is a better understanding of the different modes of statistical inference and a better understanding of how statistical inference relates to scientific inference.
Similar books and articles
When can non‐commutative statistical inference be Bayesian?Miklós Rédei - 1992 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (2):129-132.
An a priori solution to the replication crisis.David Trafimow - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (8):1188-1214.
The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1974 - Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel.
Error statistical modeling and inference: Where methodology meets ontology.Aris Spanos & Deborah G. Mayo - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3533-3555.
Is There a Free Lunch in Inference?Jeffrey N. Rouder, Richard D. Morey, Josine Verhagen, Jordan M. Province & Eric-Jan Wagenmakers - 2016 - Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (3):520-547.
A New Account of Replication in the Experimental Life Sciences.Stephan Guttinger - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (3):453-471.
On the Foundations of Statistical Inference.Allan Birnbaum - 1962 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 57 (298):269--306.
Statistical explanation vs. statistical inference.Richard Jeffrey - 1969 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel. pp. 104--113.
Foundations of probability theory, statistical inference, and statistical theories of science.W. Hooker, C., Harper (ed.) - 1975 - Springer.
Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science.Bernd I. Dahn - 1978 - Studia Logica 37 (2):213-219.
Another Look at Looking Time: Surprise as Rational Statistical Inference.Zi L. Sim & Fei Xu - 2019 - Topics in Cognitive Science 11 (1):154-163.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
The safe, the sensitive, and the severely tested: a unified account.Georgi Gardiner & Brian Zaharatos - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-33.
References found in this work
Error and the growth of experimental knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
Using Bayes to get the most out of non-significant results.Zoltan Dienes - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):455-459.
Dynamical Models: An Alternative or Complement to Mechanistic Explanations?David M. Kaplan & William Bechtel - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):438-444.