Statistical Inference and the Replication Crisis

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (1):121-147 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The replication crisis has prompted many to call for statistical reform within the psychological sciences. Here we examine issues within Frequentist statistics that may have led to the replication crisis, and we examine the alternative—Bayesian statistics—that many have suggested as a replacement. The Frequentist approach and the Bayesian approach offer radically different perspectives on evidence and inference with the Frequentist approach prioritising error control and the Bayesian approach offering a formal method for quantifying the relative strength of evidence for hypotheses. We suggest that rather than mere statistical reform, what is needed is a better understanding of the different modes of statistical inference and a better understanding of how statistical inference relates to scientific inference.

Similar books and articles

Why Replication is Overrated.Uljana Feest - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (5):895-905.
When can non‐commutative statistical inference be Bayesian?Miklós Rédei - 1992 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (2):129-132.
An a priori solution to the replication crisis.David Trafimow - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (8):1188-1214.
On the Foundations of Statistical Inference.Allan Birnbaum - 1962 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 57 (298):269--306.
Replication without replicators.Bence Nanay - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):455-477.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-11-06

Downloads
183 (#70,459)

6 months
61 (#20,095)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Lincoln Colling
Cambridge University

References found in this work

Error and the growth of experimental knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):455-459.

View all 10 references / Add more references