On the Relationship Between Law and Morality

Ratio Juris 2 (1):66-78 (1989)
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Abstract

Instead of being embarrassed and uneasy about the implications of the separation thesis, positivists should welcome the fact that they cannot account for the obligatoriness of law. The rule of recognition is only a social rule and introduces no grounds for obligation.

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Jules Coleman
Constructor University

Citations of this work

Natural Law Theories.Jonathan Crowe - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (2):91-101.
Associative Obligation and Law's Authority.Stephen Utz - 2004 - Ratio Juris 17 (3):285-314.
The Interchangeability of Perspectives Between the Victim and the Offender as an Element of Punishment.Bartosz Wojciechowski - 2014 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 27 (2):277-290.

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References found in this work

Markets, morals, and the law.Jules L. Coleman - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Markets, Morals and the Law.[author unknown] - 1990 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 52 (2):367-368.

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