Abstract

In my dissertation, I examine Hume's attempt to formulate a science of human nature on par with Newton's science of physical nature. There are a number of reasons why Hume's positive proposals about the workings of the mind and the development of knowledge must be taken seriously. First, his science of human nature is more sophisticated than previously recognized. The central hypothesis of Hume's account is that all knowledge emerges from the interaction of sensory information with associative propensities of the mind. This interactionism provides a unified account of the acquisition of complex and general ideas in Part I of the Treatise, and the formation of our natural beliefs in causes and objects in Parts III and IV. Second, his science of human nature does a good deal of philosophical work in the Treatise. For example, Hume puts it to work in order to resolve the early modern controversies over innate and abstract ideas, and it also serves as the grounds from which he derives a number of his substantive epistemological conclusions about causation and the external world. Finally, Hume's science of human nature is more plausible than has been recognized by even his most charitable interpreters, I claim that not only can Hume's account be defended, but that it is being defended. The fact is that each of Hume's central hypotheses has proponents in contemporary cognitive science