Impossible Words Again: Or Why Beds Break but Not Make

Mind and Language 26 (2):234-260 (2011)
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Abstract

Do lexical items have internal structure that contributes to, or determines, the stable interpretation of their potential hosts? One argument in favour of the claim that lexical items are so structured is that certain putative verbs appear to be ‘impossible’, where the intended interpretation of them is apparently precluded by the character of their internal structure. The adequacy of such reasoning has recently been debated by Fodor and Lepore and Johnson, but to no apparent resolution. The present paper argues that such ‘impossible word arguments' for internal lexical structure, although not apodictic, do constitute inferences to the best explanation for such structure. Alternative explanations for the ‘impossible words' are considered and rejected

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2011-03-16

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Citations of this work

Meaning, Concepts, and the Lexicon.Michael Glanzberg - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):1-29.
Non-Holistic Meaning Anatomism and the No-Principled-Basis Consideration.Chun-Ping Yen - 2017 - CHUL HAK SA SANG - Journal of Philosophical Ideas:201-221.
Concepts and Analytic Intuitions.Bradley Rives - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):285-314.

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References found in this work

Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use.Noam Chomsky - 1986 - Prager. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited.Jerry A. Fodor - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Jerry A. Fodor.

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