Is probability the only coherent approach to uncertainty?

Abstract

In this article, I discuss an argument that purports to prove that probability theory is the only sensible means of dealing with uncertainty. I show that this argument can succeed only if some rather controversial assumptions about the nature of uncertainty are accepted. I discuss these assumptions and provide reasons for rejecting them. I also present examples of what I take to..

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2009-03-04

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Mark Colyvan
University of Sydney

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