Being realistic - why physicalism may entail panexperientialism

Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):40-52 (2006)
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Abstract

In this paper I first examine two important assumptions underlying the argument that physicalism entails panpsychism. These need unearthing because opponents in the literature distinguish themselves from Strawson in the main by rejecting one or the other. Once they have been stated, and something has been said about the positions that reject them, the onus of argument becomes clear: the assumptions require careful defence. I believe they are true, in fact, but their defence is a large project that cannot begin here. So, in the final section I comment on what follows if they are granted. I agree with Strawson that --broadly -- 'panpsychism' is the direction in which philosophy of mind should be heading; nevertheless, there are certain difficulties in the detail of his position. In light of these I argue for changes to the doctrine, bringing it into line with the slightly.

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Sam Coleman
University of Hertfordshire

Citations of this work

Panpsychism.William E. Seager, Philip Goff & Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Subject of Experience.Galen Strawson - 2017 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Mind and Being: The Primacy of Panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2016 - In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 000-00.
Qualia.Michael Tye - 1997 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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