Comments on Lycan's ‘Conditional-Assertion Theories of Conditionals’

Philosophical Communications (2007)
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Abstract

The overall strategy of Lycan’s paper is to distinguish three kinds of conditional assertion theories, and then to show, in order, how they are variously afflicted by a set of problems. The three kinds of theory were the Quine-Rhinelander theory (or the Simple Illocutionary theory), The Semanticized Quine-Rhinelander, and the No Truth Value theory (or NTV). This strategy offers considerable clarity, but it comes at a cost, for what I take to be the best version of a conditional assertion theory contains core parts of all three theories. In what follows, I will suggest that many of the objections offered by Lycan can be dealt when all the pieces are taken into consideration at the same time. But I will also suggest that a refined version of what Lycan called the Immediate Implausibility objection does show us that the conditional assertion theory is false.

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Gunnar Björnsson
Stockholm University

Citations of this work

Strawson on 'if' and ⊃.Gunnar Björnsson - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):24-35.

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