Belief Revision in Science: Informational Economy and Paraconsistency

Contemplação 1 (15):19-38 (2017)
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Abstract

In the present paper, our objective is to examine the application of belief revision models to scientific rationality. We begin by considering the standard model AGM, and along the way a number of problems surface that make it seem inadequate for this specific application. After considering three different heuristics of informational economy that seem fit for science, we consider some possible adaptations for it and argue informally that, overall, some paraconsistent models seem to better satisfy these principles, following Testa (2015). These models have been worked out in formal detail by Testa, Cogniglio, & Ribeiro (2015, 2017).

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Daniel Coimbra
Universidade Estadual de Campinas

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