The Pareto Argument for Inequality*: G. A. COHEN

Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1):160-185 (1995)
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Abstract

Some ways of defending inequality against the charge that it is unjust require premises that egalitarians find easy to dismiss—statements, for example, about the contrasting deserts and/or entitlements of unequally placed people. But a defense of inequality suggested by John Rawls and elaborated by Brian Barry has often proved irresistible even to people of egalitarian outlook. The persuasive power of this defense of inequality has helped to drive authentic egalitarianism, of an old-fashioned, uncompromising kind, out of contemporary political philosophy. The present essay is part of an attempt to bring it back in.

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Author's Profile

Gina Cohen
Universidad Anahuac del Sur (PhD)

Citations of this work

Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice.G. A. Cohen - 1997 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (1):3-30.
Institutions and the Demands of Justice.Liam B. Murphy - 1998 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (4):251-291.
Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity.Andrew Williams - 1998 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (3):225-247.
Taking People as They Are?Joshua Cohen - 2001 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (4):363-386.
Basic Structure and the Value of Equality.A. J. Julius - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (4):321-355.

View all 31 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - Philosophy 52 (199):102-105.
Mortal Questions.[author unknown] - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):578-578.
Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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