Subjectivism, physicalism or none of the above? Comments on Ross's The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism

Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):94-104 (2001)
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Abstract

In “The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism,” Peter Ross argues against what he calls subjectivism — the view that “colors are not describable in physical terms, ... [but are] mental processes or events of visual states” (2),1 and in favor of physicalism — a view according to which colors are “physical properties of physical objects, such as reflectance properties” (10). He rejects an argument that has been offered in support of subjectivism, and argues that, since no form of subjectivism is able to account for our perception of color, we are better off adopting physicalism.

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Jonathan Cohen
University of California, San Diego

Citations of this work

Color.Barry Maund - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
True Colours, False Theories.V. Arstila - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):41-50.

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References found in this work

Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
How to Speak of the Colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.
An Objectivist's Guide to Subjectivism About Color.Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter - 1987 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 41 (1):127-141.

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