Specialized mechanisms for theory of mind: Are mental representations special because they are mental or because they are representations?

Cognition 136 (C):49-63 (2015)
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References found in this work

On sense and reference.Gottlob Frege - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 36--56.
Thought and talk.Donald Davidson - 1975 - In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and language. Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. pp. 1975--7.
Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?Tim Crane - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.

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