It's not easy being green : Hardin and color relationalism

In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press (2010)
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Abstract

But Hardin hasn’t contented himself with reframing traditional philosoph- ical issues about color in a way that is sensitive to relevant empirical con- straints. In addition, he has been a staunch defender of color eliminativism — the view that there are no colors, qua properties of tables, chairs, and other mind-external objects, and a vociferous critic of several varieties of re- alism about color that have been defended by others (e.g., [Hardin, 2003], [Hardin, 2005]). These other views include the so-called color physical- ism of [Hilbert, 1987], [Byrne and Hilbert, 1997a], [Byrne and Hilbert, 2003], and [Tye, 2000],1 and, inconveniently, even the relationalist view defended in [Cohen, 2003a], [Cohen, 2004a], [Cohen, 2003b], [McLaughlin, 2003], and [Jakab and McLaughlin, 2003]

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Author's Profile

Jonathan Cohen
University of California, San Diego

References found in this work

Values and Secondary Qualities.John McDowell - 1985 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and objectivity: a tribute to J.L. Mackie. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp. 110-129.
Another look at color.Colin McGinn - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (11):537-53.
The place of color in nature.Brian McLaughlin - 2003 - In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press. pp. 475--502.
The many moral realisms.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):1-22.

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