Rachel Cohon
State University of New York, Albany
: Hume's account of the virtue of fidelity to promises contains two surprising claims: 1) Any analysis of fidelity that treats it as a natural (nonconventional) virtue is incorrect because it entails that in promising we perform a "peculiar act of the mind," an act of creating obligation by willing oneself to be obligated. No such act is possible. 2) Though the obligation of promises depends upon social convention, not on such a mental act, we nonetheless "feign" that whenever someone promises he performs such an act. This paper explains both in light of the philosophical questions about promising that lie behind Hume's investigation, his virtue theory, and the general difficulties he believes we face trying to understand virtues that are in fact artificial in terms of our common-sense, natural conception of virtue. It extracts a lesson for contemporary virtue ethics about the motive of duty
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2006.0007
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The Normative Force of Promising.Jack Woods - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 6:77-101.
Promises.Allen Habib - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A obrigação da promessa em Hume.André Klaudat - 2011 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 52 (124):429-445.
Brand as Promise.Vikram R. Bhargava & Suneal Bedi - forthcoming - Journal of Business Ethics:1-18.

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