Abstract
Contrary to the commonly held position of Luis de Molina, Thomas Flint and others, I argue that counterfactuals of divine freedom are pre-volitional for God within the Molinist framework. That is, CDFs are not true even partly in virtue of some act of God’s will. As a result, I argue that the Molinist God fails to satisfy an epistemic openness requirement for rational deliberation, and thus she cannot rationally deliberate about which world to actualize.
Keywords Counterfactuals of freedom  Deliberation  Divine freedom  Libertarianism  Middle knowledge  Molinism
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11153-015-9542-1
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David Kellogg Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-135.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.

View all 93 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Molinism and Supercomprehension: Grounding Counterfactual Truth.John David Laing - 2000 - Dissertation, The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary
Best Feasible Worlds: Divine Freedom and Leibniz’s Lapse.Justin Mooney - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):219-229.
Molinism and Theological Compatibilism.Christoph Jäger - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):71-92.
Conditionals of Freedom as Bivalent: A Defense of Middle Knowledge.Dean Allan Kowalski - 2000 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
Reconciling Omniscience and Freedom: Ockhamist and Molinist Strategies.Mark Daniel Linville - 1991 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
On Behalf of Maverick Molinism.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (3):348-357.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-09-22

Total views
442 ( #21,057 of 2,498,156 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
44 ( #19,284 of 2,498,156 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes