Philosophia 46 (1):57-67 (2018)

Abstract
Recent experimental studies dispute the position that commonsense morality accepts ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’, the view that, necessarily, if an agent ought to perform some action, then she can perform that action. This paper considers and supports explanations for the results of these studies on the hypothesis that OIC is intuitive and true.
Keywords ought implies can
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-017-9892-2
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Moral Obligation.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.
'Ought' and Ability.P. A. Graham & Peter Graham - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (3):337-382.

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