Rolling Back the Luck Problem for Libertarianism

Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1):121-137 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I here sketch a reply to Peter van Inwagen’s Rollback Argument, which suggests that libertarian accounts of free agency are beset by problems involving luck. Van Inwagen imagines an indeterministic agent whose universe is repeatedly ‘rolled back’ by God to the time of her choice. Since the agent’s choice is indeterministic, her choices are sometimes di erent in the imaginary rollback scenarios. I show that although this is true, this need not impair her control over what she does. I develop an account of when and why the fact that an agent would choose di erently impairs control, which provides a novel response to the Rollback Argument.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On the Luck Objection to Libertarianism.David Widerker - 2015 - In Carlos Moya, Andrei Buckareff & Sergi Rosell (eds.), Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 94-115.
Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism.Robert J. Hartman - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42 (1):301-312.
Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
Libertarianism, luck, and control.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):381-407.
Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):1-21.
In Defense of Non-Causal Libertarianism.David Widerker - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):1-14.
Bad Luck Once Again.Neil Levy - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):749-754.
Kane, luck, and the significance of free will.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):96-104.
Agent causation and the problem of luck.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421.
Luck’s Extended Reach.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):191-218.
Libertarianism and the luck objection.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2000 - The Journal of Ethics 4 (4):329-337.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-10-17

Downloads
182 (#104,126)

6 months
36 (#96,389)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Zac Cogley
Ohio State University (PhD)

Citations of this work

Taking Hobart Seriously.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (4):1407-1426.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Randolph Clarke - 2003 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 16 references / Add more references