Incompatibilist Commitment and Moral Self‐Knowledge: The Epistemology of Libertarianism

Philosophical Issues 26 (1):78-98 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The case for hyper-libertarianism.Gerald Harrison - 2006 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):1-6.
Betting Against Compatibilism.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2010 - Res Publica 16 (4):383-396.
Soft libertarianism and hard compatibilism.Gary Watson - 1999 - The Journal of Ethics 3 (4):351-365.
Don’t panic: Self-authorship without obscure metaphysics1.Adina L. Roskies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):323-342.
God’s Divinely Justified Knowledge is Incompatible with Human Free Will.John Shook - 2010 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 15 (1):141-159.
Moral Commitment and Moral Theory.Sarah Stroud - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26:381-398.
Luck’s Extended Reach.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):191-218.
The Problem of Enhanced Control.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.
Self-Knowledge and Closure.Sven Bernecker - 1998 - In Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge. CSLI Publications. pp. 333-349.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-10-22

Downloads
40 (#378,975)

6 months
5 (#544,079)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

E. J. Coffman
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Citations of this work

Knowing About Responsibility.Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (3):201-216.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.

View all 32 references / Add more references