Humana Mente 6 (25) (2013)

Abstract
In this paper we explain how the intentional objects of our mental states can be represented by the intensional objects of conceptual realism. We first briefly examine and show how Brentano’s actualist theory of judgment and his notion of an immanent object have a clear and natural representation in our conceptualist logic of names. We then briefly critically examine Meinong’s theory of objects before turning finally to our own representation of intentional objects in terms of the intensional objects of conceptual realism. We conclude by explaining why existence-entailing concepts are so basic to our commonsense framework and how these concepts and their intensions can be used to model Meinong’s ontology.
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References found in this work BETA

Nonexistent Objects.Terence Parsons - 1980 - Yale University Press.
Nonexistent Objects.Fabrizio Mondadori - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (3):427.

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