Abstract

Philosophers have often argued against theological morality, the view that morality depends in some essential way on the will and character of God. Virtues and Divine Commands defines theological morality, and defends the view defined against four common objections to the complete dependence of morality on God, the objections from the supposed autonomy of ethics, from the fact that such dependence would make morality arbitrary, from the supposition that it would render common moral knowledge invalid, and from the notion that it would involve an illegitimate derivation of an "ought" from an "is". It is argued that theological morality survives these objections unscathed. Furthermore, it provides an explanation for the nature and binding character of moral law which is more satisfactory than the alternatives usually proposed. ;Theological morality is often described as "Divine Command Morality." This emphasises the connection between moral law and divine commands, but neglects other important aspects of ethics, especially those concerns about human nature, human needs, human character and human goals and welfare which are the particular province of the ethics of the virtues. This essay shows that an adequate account of ethics must include discussion of virtues as well as moral laws, and that neither of these aspects of moral life is more fundamental than the other, nor can one be reduced to the other. Furthermore, theological morality provides a more satisfactory account of the virtues and why we need them than do various alternatives examined. To show this, the virtue ethics of G. H. Von Wright, James Wallace, Philippa Foot and Alasdair MacIntyre are examined in some detail, with special attention to their definitions of what a virtue is and their answers to the question, why men need the virtues. Finally, a theistic account of the virtues is offered as an alternative which, if acceptable on other grounds, would answer the questions which the four views examined are unable to answer