Environmental Ethics 40 (3):241-260 (2019)

Authors
Brendan Cline
California State University, Channel Islands
Abstract
Many environmentalists hold that the loss of a species is intrinsically bad, and many also think that we have moral obligations to species as such. In an attempt to capture these thoughts, some philosophers have suggested that species are bearers of intrinsic value. This approach works well in paradigmatic cases. However, it begins to break down in more difficult scenarios, such as when species boundaries are unclear or when resources are scarce. The case study of the Galápagos giant tortoises in this essay illustrates the limitations of traditional accounts of the non-instrumental value of species. Careful attention to this case indicates how species-centric accounts diverge from the evaluative attitudes of environmentalists, and suggests new directions for theoretical replacements.
Keywords species  value of species
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2018, 2019
ISBN(s) 0163-4275
DOI 10.5840/enviroethics201840322
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,066
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Species Equality and the Foundations of Moral Theory.James C. Anderson - 1993 - Environmental Values 2 (4):347 - 365.
Intrinsic Value, Moral Standing, and Species.Rick O’Neil - 1997 - Environmental Ethics 19 (1):45-52.
Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism.Ingo Brigandt - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1305–1316.
Crossing Species Boundaries.Jason Scott Robert & Françoise Baylis - 2003 - American Journal of Bioethics 3 (3):1 – 13.
Why Do Species Matter?Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1981 - Environmental Ethics 3 (2):101-112.
Why Do Species Matter?Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1981 - Environmental Ethics 3 (2):101-112.
A (Not-so-Radical) Solution to the Species Problem.Bradley E. Wilson - 1995 - Biology and Philosophy 10 (3):339-356.
The Cladistic Solution to the Species Problem.Mark Ridley - 1989 - Biology and Philosophy 4 (1):1-16.
Cento E Quarenta Anos Sem Charles Darwin Bastam: Sobre Variedades, Espécies E Indivíduos.Ricardo Wainzbort - 2000 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 4 (1):141-184.
Why Should We Care About Rare Species?Alastair S. Gunn - 1980 - Environmental Ethics 2 (1):17-37.
What is a Species, and What is Not?Ernst Mayr - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (2):262-277.
Why Should We Care About Rare Species?Alastair S. Gunn - 1980 - Environmental Ethics 2 (1):17-37.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-07-24

Total views
82 ( #139,946 of 2,498,770 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #67,653 of 2,498,770 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes