Relations of homology between higher cognitive emotions and basic emotions

Biology and Philosophy 25 (1):75-94 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In the last 10 years, several authors including Griffiths and Matthen have employed classificatory principles from biology to argue for a radical revision in the way that we individuate psychological traits. Arguing that the fundamental basis for classification of traits in biology is that of ‘homology’ (similarity due to common descent) rather than ‘analogy’, or ‘shared function’, and that psychological traits are a special case of biological traits, they maintain that psychological categories should be individuated primarily by relations of homology rather than in terms of shared function. This poses a direct challenge to the dominant philosophical view of how to define psychological categories, viz., ‘functionalism’. Although the implications of this position extend to all psychological traits, the debate has centered around ‘emotion’ as an example of a psychological category ripe for reinterpretation within this new framework of classification. I address arguments by Griffiths that emotions should be divided into at least two distinct classes, basic emotions and higher cognitive emotions, and that these two classes require radically different theories to explain them. Griffiths argues that while basic emotions in humans are homologous to the corresponding states in other animals, higher cognitive emotions are dependent on mental capacities unique to humans, and are therefore not homologous to basic emotions. Using the example of shame, I argue that (a) many emotions that are commonly classified as being higher cognitive emotions actually correspond to certain basic emotions, and that (b) the “higher cognitive forms” of these emotions are best seen as being homologous to their basic forms.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,127

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-05-27

Downloads
20 (#793,209)

6 months
217 (#12,891)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Emotion.Ronald de Sousa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Emotion.R. De Sousa - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 3.
Are all emotions social? Embracing a pluralistic understanding of social emotions.Gen Eickers - forthcoming - Passion: Journal of the European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotion.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations