Abstract

In this essay I offer an assessment of W. V. Quine's immanent natural position for the above three areas of philosophical interest. With the case of meaning, I argue that in light of a proposal by Jerrold J. Katz, there appear to be major internal considerations to indicate that Quine's skeptical views on meaning currently should be "softened." I will argue that this point, while pro tem, is consistent with a broad interpretation of Quine's naturalistic outlook. I further urge that such a broad interpretation is required to account for the progressive natural philosophy that Quine is committed to. The issue of epistemic skepticism is then addressed directly. Barry Stroud's influential work on the importance of philosophical skepticism contains an explicit challenge to Quine's naturalism and Stroud argues that naturalized epistemology either fails as epistemology, or it fails to be epistemology. On this debate I argue that Quine can enlist grounds to hold that the immanent naturalized position currently enjoys an ascending viability against Stroud's skeptical challenge. Quine's position is then shown to be strengthened by an immanent construal of scientific truth that provides a straightforward way of rejecting Stroud's claim that naturalized epistemology fails. However, I conclude the essay with a critical treatment of whether Quine's move to immanence does full justice to the concept of scientific truth. While Quine asserts that the only conception of truth that he recognizes is an immanent one, I try to show that pending further argument to the contrary, the concept of truth cannot be immanently construed without sacrificing much of the progressive scientific outlook that Quine otherwise endorses. If I am right on this score, until such arguments are forthcoming, not only do Stroud's criticisms regain vigor, but issue is raised regarding Quine's emphasis on immanent standards of clarification and whether this requirement can ultimately improve our understanding of natural science