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Doxastic Conditions for Backward Induction
Theory and Decision 54 (4):315-336 (2003)
Abstract
The problem of finding sufficient doxastic conditions for backward induction in games of perfect information is analyzed in a syntactic framework with subjunctive conditionals. This allows to describe the structure of the game by a logical formula and consequently to treat beliefs about this structure in the same way as beliefs about rationality. A backward induction and a non-Nash equilibrium result based on higher level belief in rationality and the structure of the game are derived.My notes
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Citations of this work
Keep 'hoping' for rationality: A solution to the backward induction paradox.Alexandru Baltag, Sonja Smets & Jonathan Alexander Zvesper - 2009 - Synthese 169 (2):301 - 333.
Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2010 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
Keep ‘hoping’ for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox.Alexandru Baltag, Sonja Smets & Jonathan Alexander Zvesper - 2009 - Synthese 169 (2):301-333.
Common Knowledge of Rationality in Extensive Games.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2008 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (3):261-280.
References found in this work
A guide to completeness and complexity for modal logics of knowledge and belief.Joseph Y. Halpern & Yoram Moses - 1992 - Artificial Intelligence 54 (3):319-379.
Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games.Robert Stalnaker - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (2):133.
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