Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (2):131-150 (2002)
AbstractThe dismissive attitude of intellectuals toward conspiracy theorists is considered and given some justification. It is argued that intellectuals are entitled to an attitude of prima facie skepticism toward the theories propounded by conspiracy theorists, because conspiracy theorists have an irrational tendency to continue to believe in conspiracy theories, even when these take on the appearance of forming the core of degenerating research program. It is further argued that the pervasive effect of the "fundamental attribution error" can explain the behavior of such conspiracy theorists. A rival approach due to Brian Keeley, which involves the criticism of a subclass of conspiracy theories on epistemic grounds, is considered and found to be inadequate. Key Words: conspiracy conspiracy theories conspiracy theorizing.
Similar books and articles
Conspiracy Theories and the Internet: Controlled Demolition and Arrested Development.Steve Clarke - 2007 - Episteme 4 (2):167-180.
Conspiracy Theories of Quantum Mechanics.Peter J. Lewis - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):359-381.
Popper Revisited, or What is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories?Charles Pigden - 1995 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 25 (1):3-34.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Conspiracy Theories and Evidential Self-Insulation.M. Giulia Napolitano - 2021 - In Sven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford University Press. pp. 82-105.
When Inferring to a Conspiracy Might Be the Best Explanation.Matthew R. X. Dentith - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (5-6):572-591.
References found in this work
Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.Richard E. Nisbett & Lee Ross - 1980 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Prentice-Hall.
Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior.John M. Doris - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.Christopher Cherniak, Richard Nisbett & Lee Ross - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (3):462.