Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility, by Dana Kay Nelkin

Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):596-600 (2014)
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10.1080/09515089.2012.749443

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References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Elbow Room by Daniel C. Dennett. [REVIEW]Gary Watson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (9):517-522.

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