Epistemic norms without voluntary control

Noûs 43 (4):599-632 (2009)
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Abstract

William Alston’s argument against the deontological conception of epistemic justification is a classic—and much debated—piece of contemporary epistemology. At the heart of Alston’s argument, however, lies a very simple mistake which, surprisingly, appears to have gone unnoticed in the vast literature now devoted to the argument. After having shown why some of the standard responses to Alston’s argument don’t work, we elucidate the mistake and offer a hypothesis as to why it has escaped attention.

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Author Profiles

Philippe Chuard
Southern Methodist University
Nicholas Southwood
Australian National University

Citations of this work

There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame.Cameron Boult - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):518-534.
Epistemic blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (8):e12762.
The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press.

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