On Logical Strength and Weakness

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History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (1):47-51 (1989)
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Abstract

First, we consider an argument due to Popper for maximal strength in choice of logic. We dispute this argument, taking a lead from some remarks by Susan Haack; but we defend a set of contrary considerations for minimal strength in logic. Finally, we consider the objection that Popper presupposes the distinctness of logic from science. We conclude from this that all claims to logical truth may be in equal epistemological trouble

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10.1080/01445348908837141

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Chris Mortensen
University of Adelaide

Citations of this work

Logical Maximalism in the Empirical Sciences.Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2021 - In Parusniková Zuzana & Merritt David (eds.), Karl Popper's Science and Philosophy. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 171-184.
Logical Friendliness and Sympathy in Logic.David C. Makinson - 2005 - In J. Y. Beziau (ed.), Logica Universalis. Birkhäuser Verlog. pp. 191--205.
Popper, Refutation and 'Avoidance' of Refutation.Greg Bamford - 1989 - Dissertation, The University of Queensland
Prior and rennie on times and tenses.Chris Mortensen - 1995 - History and Philosophy of Logic 16 (1):65-73.

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References found in this work

Objective knowledge.Karl Raimund Popper - 1972 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press.
Truth and other enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1978 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Conjectures and Refutations.K. Popper - 1963 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.
Relevant Logics and Their Rivals.Richard Routley, Val Plumwood, Robert K. Meyer & Ross T. Brady - 1982 - Ridgeview. Edited by Richard Sylvan & Ross Brady.
Deviant logic: some philosophical issues.Susan Haack - 1974 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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