God, physicalism, and the totality of facts

Philosophy 82 (4):515-542 (2007)
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Abstract

The paper offers a general critique of physicalism and of one variety of nonphysicalism, arguing that such theses are untenable. By distinguishing between the absolute conception of reality and the causal completeness of physics it shows that the 'explanatory gap' is not merely epistemic but metaphysical. It defends the essential subjectivity and unity of consciousness and its inseparability from a self-conscious autonomous rational and moral being. Casting a favourable light on dualism freed from misconceptions, it suggests that the only plausible way forward in the search for an understanding of both physical and mental reality is a recognition of the mind as a metaphysically distinct entity

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2009-01-28

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Andrea Christofidou
University of London

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.
The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.
Mental causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.

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