Self-Evidence and Proof

Philosophy 33 (127):289 - 302 (1958)
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Abstract

There is an argument, well known in the history of philosophy, which makes all knowledge ultimately depend on some kind of intuitive or sensory immediacy. According to this argument, either the proposition itself is self–evident; 2 or else it can be shown to follow, with the help of a chain of intermediate links, from other propositions which are self–evident. Moreover, it is this self–evidence of immediate knowledge and only this which, again speaking traditionally, sufficiently guarantees the truth of the affirmations of a science as opposed to those of various and fluctuating opinions

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Citations of this work

The experimenters' regress: from skepticism to argumentation.Benoı̂t Godin & Yves Gingras - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (1):133-148.
A Bibliography of the New Rhetoric Project.David A. Frank & William Driscoll - 2010 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 43 (4):449-466.

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References found in this work

Traité de l'Argumentation.Charles Perelman - 1961 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 15 (1):142-144.
Rhétorique et Philosophie.Ch Perelman & L. Olbrechts-Tyteca - 1960 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 16 (3):398-398.

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