Problem zwierzęcej świadomości
Abstract
The subject of this article is the problem of animal consciousness. Our folk interpretations and explanations of animal behaviour appeal to conscious mental states like e.g. fear or anger. Scholars, however, do not agree as to whether animals do in fact have conscious mental states similar to humans. According to Shettleworth, one may distinguish three positions in relation to this problem: radical opponents of the concept of animal consciousness who claim that animal are not conscious in any interesting sense; sceptics who believe that some species probably do have consciousness yet it cannot be subject to scientific investigations due to subjective nature of conscious mental states; cognitive ethologists who believe that most species are potentially conscious and the central task for behavioural biologists is the investigation of the nature of their consciousness ; cognitive ethologists argue that their claims are supported by four arguments connected with gradual evolution; flexible and complex behaviour; animal communication, and neurophysiological similarity. These arguments have to face strong philosophical counter-arguments, especially the one from multiple realizability and the zombie hypothesis. In response, a new methodological approach is proposed to avoid these difficulties. It is based on Morgan’s Canon, interpreted here as a kind of zoo-psychological Ockham’s razor. Key words ANIMAL, CONSCIOUSNESS, SHETTLEWORTH