Ethics 125 (3):851-853, (
2015)
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Abstract
In “On duties to oneself,” Marcus G. Singer argued that, contrary to long established philosophical tradition, there are no duties to oneself. Singer observes that to have a duty is to be accountable to someone for that duty’s fulfillment, and while she to whom a duty is owed may release the person who has the duty from being bound to fulfill it, the latter cannot release herself from the duty. For releasing oneself from a duty is no different from simply opting not to fulfill it, which would make the duty no more than a mere option and rob it of its categorical character. Singer thus argues that
(a) A has a duty against herself;
(b) if A has a duty against herself, then A is accountable to herself for the duty’s performance;
(c) if A has a duty against herself, A can release herself from the duty; and
(d) because a person is accountable to the individual owed the duty for its fulfillment, no one can release herself from an obligation,
form an inconsistent set