Compulsory victim restitution is punishment: A reply to Boonin

Public Reason 2 (1):85-93 (2010)
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Abstract

David Boonin has recently argued that although no existing theory of legal punishment provides adequate moral justification for the practice of punishing criminal wrongdoing, compulsory victim restitution (CVR) is a morally justified response to such wrongdoing. Here I argue that Boonin’s thesis is false because CVR is a form of punishment. I first support this claim with an argument that Boonin’s denial that CVR is a form of punishment requires a groundless distinction between a state’s response to a criminal offense and its response to an offender’s failure to comply with the sanctions imposed for that offense. I then suggest that this argument points to a definition of punishment that not only meets Boonin’s own desiderata for a definition of punishment but also implies that CVR is a form of punishment. Finally, I argue that CVR is a form of punishment even under Boonin’s own proposed definition of punishment.

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Michael Cholbi
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

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On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Two concepts of rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.

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