Some problems for bayesian confirmation theory

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):551-560 (1987)
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Citations of this work

Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Van Fraassen's Critique Of Inference To The Best Explanation.Samir Okasha - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (4):691-710.
Epistemic Probabilities are Degrees of Support, not Degrees of (Rational) Belief.Nevin Climenhaga - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):153-176.
Subjective and objective confirmation.Patrick Maher - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (2):149-174.

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References found in this work

Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1982 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (4):547.
Bayesianism and support by novel facts.Colin Howson - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (3):245-251.
Some recent objections to the bayesian theory of support.Colin Howson - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):305-309.

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