Type composition, career concerns, and signaling efforts

Theory and Decision 73 (3):401-422 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A modified version of Spence’s signaling model is analyzed to explore the relationships among the type composition, career concerns, and signal effort levels chosen by agents. We show that an increase in the proportion of high-type agents does not change an agent’s effort levels monotonically. High signaling efforts are induced when the proportion of the high type is in the middle range. Moreover, when the proportion of the high type is small, career concerns increase the signaling effort levels and have a more positive influence on the effort level of a high-type agent. However, when the proportion of the high type is large, career concerns might instead decrease the effort levels

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The flow of information in signaling games.Brian Skyrms - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):155 - 165.
Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information.Brian Skyrms - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-01

Downloads
48 (#323,919)

6 months
18 (#135,061)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references