Showing, analysis and the truth-functionality of logical necessity in Wittgenstein's tractatus

Synthese 139 (1):81 - 105 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper aims to explain how the Tractatus attempts to unify logic by deriving the truth-functionality of logical necessity from the thesis that a proposition shows its sense. I first interpret the Tractarian notion of showing as the displaying of what is intrinsic to an expression (or a symbol). Then I argue that, according to the Tractatus, the thesis that a proposition shows its sense implies the determinacy of sense, the possibility of the complete elimination of non-primitive symbols, the analyticity thesis and the strong analyticity thesis. The picture theory emerges as what provides the only acceptable account of an elementary proposition, subject to the constraint that a proposition must show its sense. The picture theory and the analyticity thesis then entail the contingency thesis (that an elementary proposition is contingent) and the independence thesis (that elementary propositions are mutually logically independent) which, together with the strong analyticity thesis, imply that all logical propositions are tautologies.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,261

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Possibility of language: internal tensions in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.María Cerezo - 2005 - Stanford, Calif.: Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Elementary Prepositions, Independence, and Pictures.Rod Bertolet - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:53-61.
Wittgenstein and strong mathematical verificationism.Cyrus Panjvani - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):406–425.
Manifesting belief in absolute necessity.John Divers & Daniel Y. Elstein - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):109-130.
The development of wittgenstein's views on contradiction.Laurence Goldstein - 1986 - History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (1):43-56.
Not every truth can be known (at least, not all at once).Greg Restall - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 339--354.
The Tractatus on Logical Consequence.José L. Zalabardo - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):425-442.


Added to PP

145 (#130,071)

6 months
10 (#276,350)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Leo Cheung
Chinese University of Hong Kong

Citations of this work

The unity of language and logic in Wittgenstein's tractatus.Leo K. C. Cheung - 2005 - Philosophical Investigations 29 (1):22–50.
The Concept of Testimony.Nicola Mößner - 2011 - In Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement, Papers of the 34. International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 207-209.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1956 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 12 (1):109-110.
A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.Max Black - 1964 - Cambridge University Press.
Some Remarks on Logical Form.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1929 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 9 (1):162 - 171.

View all 13 references / Add more references