Value Receptacles

Noûs 49 (2):322-332 (2015)
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Abstract

Utilitarianism is often rejected on the grounds that it fails to respect the separateness of persons, instead treating people as mere “receptacles of value”. I develop several different versions of this objection, and argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, they are all mistaken. Although there are crude forms of utilitarianism that run afoul of these objections, I advance a new form of the view—‘token-pluralistic utilitarianism’—that does not

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Author's Profile

Richard Y. Chappell
University of Miami

Citations of this work

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The Many, the Few, and the Nature of Value.Daniel Muñoz - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):70-87.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Practical Ethics.Peter Singer - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.

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