- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Value Holism
Abstract
This paper considers the relation between the value of a whole (person, society) and its parts (timeslices, individuals), arguing that the contributory value of a part cannot be determined in isolation. For example, the value of an additional life may depend on what other lives there are. This has important implications for population ethics, and especially Parfit's 'repugnant conclusion'.Author's Profile
Links
PhilArchive
External links
(no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Only published works are available at libraries.
My notes
Similar books and articles
Conceptual foundations for environmental ethics: A daoist perspective.Karyn Lai - 2003 - Environmental Ethics 25 (3):247-266.
The repugnant conclusion.Jesper Ryberg, Torbjörn Tännsjö & Gustaf Arrhenius - 2006 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Online; Last Accessed October 4:2006.
Repugnance or Intransitivity: A Repugnant But Forced Choice.Stuart Rachels - 2004 - In Jesper Ryberg Torbjorn Tannsjo (ed.), The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 163--86.
Moderate holism and the instability thesis.Henry Jackman - 1999 - American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):361-69.
A theory of holism for nursing.Simon Woods - 1998 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 1 (3):255-261.
In defense of conceptual holism: Reply to Fodor and Lepore.Andrew Pessin - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:269-280.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-03-27
Downloads
596 (#16,818)
6 months
54 (#29,006)
2009-03-27
Downloads
596 (#16,818)
6 months
54 (#29,006)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
References found in this work
The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability.Stephen Darwall - 1996 - Harvard University Press.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-5ffd8f9497-mnh4c N