The Proper Function of Artifacts: Intentions, Conventions and Causal Inferences

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):391-406 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Designers’ intentions are important for determining an artifact’s proper function (i.e., its perceived real function). However, there are disagreements regarding why. In one view, people reason causally about artifacts’ functional outcomes, and designers’ intended functions become important to the extent that they allow inferring outcomes. In another view, people use knowledge of designers’ intentions to determine proper functions, but this is unrelated to causal reasoning, having perhaps to do with intentional or social forms of reasoning (e.g., authority). Regarding these latter social factors, researchers have proposed that designers’ intentions operate through a mechanism akin to social conventions, and that therefore both are determinants of proper function. In the current work, participants learned about an object’s creation, about social conventions for its use and about a specific episode where the artifact was used. The function implemented by the user could be aligned with the designer’s intended function, the social convention, both, or neither (i.e., an opportunistic use). Importantly, the use episode always resulted in an accident. Data show that the accident negatively affected proper function judgments and perceived efficiency for conventional and opportunistic functions, but not for designers’ intended functions. This is inconsistent with the view that designers’ intentions are conceptualized as causes of functional outcomes and with the idea that designers’ intentions and social conventions operate through a common mechanism

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,122

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The (Alleged) Inherent Normativity of Technological Explanations.Jeroen De Ridder - 2006 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 10 (1):79-94.
Intentions, goals, and the archaeological record.Rex Welshon - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):425-426.
Functional analysis and proper functions.Paul E. Griffiths - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):409-422.
Social Norms in Artefact Use.Marcel Scheele - 2006 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 10 (1):53-65.
Teleological semantics.Mark Rowlands - 1997 - Mind 106 (422):279-304.
In defense of proper functions.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):288-302.
The Motivational Strength of Intentions.Renée Bilodeau - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:129-135.
Fitness and function.D. M. Walsh - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):553-574.
The content of intentions.Elisabeth Patherie - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (4):400-432.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-05-14

Downloads
55 (#269,867)

6 months
9 (#185,978)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Functional analysis.Robert E. Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.
The cognitive bases of human tool use.Krist Vaesen - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (4):203-262.
The interpretation of texts, people and other artifacts.Daniel C. Dennett - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:177-194.

View all 20 references / Add more references