The Irreducibility of Iterated to Single Revision

Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (4):405-418 (2017)
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Abstract

After a number of decades of research into the dynamics of rational belief, the belief revision theory community remains split on the appropriate handling of sequences of changes in view, the issue of so-called iterated revision. It has long been suggested that the matter is at least partly settled by facts pertaining to the results of various single revisions of one’s initial state of belief. Recent work has pushed this thesis further, offering various strong principles that ultimately result in a wholesale reduction of iterated to one-shot revision. The present paper offers grounds to hold that these principles should be significantly weakened and that the reductionist thesis should ultimately be rejected. Furthermore, the considerations provided suggest a close connection between the logic of iterated belief change and the logic of evidential relevance.

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Author Profiles

Richard Booth
Cardiff University
Jake Chandler
La Trobe University

References found in this work

Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
On the logic of iterated belief revision.Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl - 1997 - Artificial Intelligence 89 (1-2):1-29.
Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-seven Iterated Theory Change Operators.Hans Rott - 2009 - In Jacek Malinowski David Makinson & Wansing Heinrich (eds.), Towards Mathematical Philosophy. Springer. pp. 269–296.

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