Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 8 (1):19-39 (2006)

Authors
Marc Champagne
Kwantlen Polytechnic University
Abstract
Structured around Charles S. Peirce's three-fold categorical scheme, this article proposes a comparative study of Ayn Rand and Peirce's realist views in general metaphysics. Rand's stance is seen as diverging with Peirce's argument from asymptotic representation but converging with arguments from brute relation and neutral category. It is argued that, by dismissing traditional subject-object dualisms, Rand and Peirce both propose iconoclastic construals of what it means to be real, dismissals made all the more noteworthy by the fact each chose to ground them in indissoluble triads of self-evident first principles
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Axiomatizing Umwelt Normativity.Marc Champagne - 2011 - Sign Systems Studies 39 (1):9-59.

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