Rational models of conditioning

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):204-205 (2009)
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Abstract

Mitchell et al. argue that conditioning phenomena may be better explained by high-level, rational processes, rather than by non-cognitive associative mechanisms. This commentary argues that this viewpoint is compatible with neuroscientific data, may extend to nonhuman animals, and casts computational models of reinforcement learning in a new light

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Citations of this work

Associationist Theories of Thought.Eric Mandelbaum - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning.Michael Waldmann (ed.) - 2017 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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