Negative Average Preference Utilitarianism

Journal of Philosophy of Life 2 (1):55-66 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX


For many philosophers working in the area of Population Ethics, it seems that either they have to confront the Repugnant Conclusion , or they have to confront the Non-Identity Problem . To them it seems there is no escape, they either have to face one problem or the other. However, there is a way around this, allowing us to escape the Repugnant Conclusion, by using what I will call Negative Average Preference Utilitarianism – which though similar to anti-frustrationism, has some important differences in practice. Current “positive” forms of utilitarianism have struggled to deal with the Repugnant Conclusion, as their theory actually entails this conclusion; however, it seems that a form of Negative Average Preference Utilitarianism easily escapes this dilemma



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,594

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Axiological Actualism.Josh Parsons - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):137 – 147.
The Diminishing Marginal Value of Happy People.James L. Hudson - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (1):123 - 137.
A Critique of the Preference Utilitarian Objection to Killing People.Suzanne Uniacke - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):209 – 217.
Moral Relativism in Context.James R. Beebe - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):691-724.
Preference and Resistance to Change Do Not Always Covary.Masaharu Takahashi - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (1):112-113.
Hare’s Reductive Justification of Preference Utilitarianism.Roger Paden - 1996 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):361-378.


Added to PP

82 (#147,141)

6 months
5 (#144,440)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Roger Chao
La Trobe University

References found in this work

Why It Is Better Never to Come Into Existence.David Benatar - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):345 - 355.
Is Unhappiness Morally More Important Than Happiness?James Griffin - 1979 - Philosophical Quarterly 29 (114):47-55.
A Pareto Principle for Possible People.Christoph Fehige - 1998 - In Christoph Fehige & Ulla Wessels (eds.), Preferences. De Gruyter. pp. 509--43.

Add more references