Intuitions in philosophy: a minimal defense

Philosophical Studies 171 (3):535-544 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In Philosophy Without Intuitions, Herman Cappelen focuses on the metaphilosophical thesis he calls Centrality: contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence for philosophical theories. Using linguistic and textual analysis, he argues that Centrality is false. He also suggests that because most philosophers accept Centrality, they have mistaken beliefs about their own methods.To put my own views on the table: I do not have a large theoretical stake in the status of intuitions, but unreflectively I find it fairly obvious that many philosophers, including myself, appeal to intuitions. Cappelen’s arguments make a provocative challenge to this unreflective background conception. So it is interesting to work through the arguments to see what they might and might not show.In what follows I aim to articulate a minimal notion of intuition that captures something of the core everyday philosophical usage of the term, and that captures the sense ..

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A priori knowledge and the scope of philosophy.George Bealer - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142.
A defense of intuitions.S. Matthew Liao - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):247 - 262.
Is There a Right of National Defense?Thomas Peard - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:341-347.
Intuitions.Nenad Miščević - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):523-548.
X-Phi Without Intuitions?Herman Cappelen - 2014 - In Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
Reflective Equilibrium Without Intuitions?Georg Brun - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):237-252.
Intuitions: Their nature and epistemic efficacy.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):51-67.
Does 'Ought' Still Imply 'Can'?Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):821-828.
Problems with the appeal to intuition in epistemology.Adam Feltz - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):131 – 141.
A Hyperimmune Minimal Degree and an ANR 2-Minimal Degree.Mingzhong Cai - 2010 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (4):443-455.
A defense of the use of intuitions in philosophy.Ernest Sosa - 2009 - In Michael Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Blackwell. pp. 101--112.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-02-19

Downloads
521 (#32,033)

6 months
29 (#93,668)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Chalmers
New York University

References found in this work

Philosophy Without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.
The incoherence of empiricism.George Bealer - 1992 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):99-138.

Add more references